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The "Dispassionate Lens" Examined
Brian J.Dunnet
I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Gonzaga University v Doe'
harmonized the Court's § 1983 and implied private right of action jurisprudence in the field of Spending Clause statutory interpretation.
Gonzaga utilized a text-centered inquiry -asking whether a particular
provision of a Spending Clause program statute contained "unambiguous rights-creating language" by being "phrased in terms of the persons benefited" - to determine that a § 1983 action brought by a former student against his alma mater under the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 would not lie. The textualist inquiry
used by the Gonzaga majority represented the latest, and most drastic,
change in the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence relating to federal statutes
enacted under Congress's spending power. Because Gonzaga presented a markedly different approach to the § 1983 inquiry in a suit
brought under one of the lowest-profile Spending Clause statutes,
lower courts have struggled to determine that decision's effect on the
§ 1983 inquiry for the highest-profile - and most expensive - statute
enacted under the Spending Clause, the Medicaid Act. As courts have
labored to determine the effect of Gonzaga in the Medicaid contextor even to determine what it means for a Medicaid Act provision to be
"phrased in terms of the persons benefited" -circuit splits have developed regarding the proper scope of the textual analysis commanded by Gonzaga and, derivatively, the § 1983 enforceability of
some of the Medicaid Act's most notable provisions.
This Comment examines the interpretative methodology utilized
by the lower federal courts in § 1983 Medicaid Act suits after Gonzaga. While courts have recognized that Gonzaga commands a textual
inquiry into whether a Medicaid Act provision "unambiguously confer[s] ...rights enforceable under § 1983,"'2 the district courts and
courts of appeals in the various federal circuits have split on the
t
1
2

BS 2004, Stanford University; JD 2007, The University of Chicago.
536 US 273 (2002).
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proper scope of this textual analysis. In particular, the respective courts
engaging in post-Gonzaga textual analysis of the Medicaid Act have
utilized two distinct analytic frameworks: "pragmatic textualism" and
"strict textualism." While pragmatic textualism has a host of doctrinal
underpinnings to recommend it, strict textualism in the § 1983 context
can only be justified on the basis of federalism. But the § 1983 federalist
concerns that might justify strict textualism in the general Spending
Clause context do not translate well to the Medicaid Act, where public
health models, empirical evidence, and the Court's own Spending
Clause doctrine counsel that the federalist concerns ostensibly justifying
strict textualism in fact command pragmatic textual analysis.
II. THE MEDICAID AC'T PUBLIC (NON)ENFORCEMENT
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE REMEDIES

The Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act,3 authorizes federal grants to states for medical assistance to low-income persons who meet certain additional qualifications.' Medicaid, enacted
under the authority of the Spending Clause,' is jointly financed by the
federal and state governments and is administered by states. Under
broad federal rules enumerated in the Medicaid Act' and its implementing regulations,' each state decides eligible groups, types and
range of services, payment levels for services, and administrative and

operating procedures.8

42 USC § 1396 (2000).
42 CFR § 430.0 (2006) ("Program Description" of the Medicaid Act).
5 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States").
6
42 USC § 1396 et seq (2000). In particular, § 1396a et seq sets out many of the Act's most
important substantive guidelines, including the so-called equal access (§ 1396a(a)(30)(A)), reasonable standards (§ 1396a(a)(17)), reasonable promptness (§ 1396a(a)(8)), comparability
(§ 1396a(a)(10)(B)), availability (§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)), and freedom of choice (§ 1396a(a)(23))
provisions. Located elsewhere within the Act are provisions governing the early and periodic
screening, diagnosis, and treatment of Medicaid-eligible children (the "EPSDT" requirements)
(§§ 1396a(a)(43) et seq, 1396r et seq) and certain requirements related to intermediate care
facilities for the mentally retarded (the "ICF/MR" provisions) (§ 1396d(a)(15)).
7
Various federal regulations supplement and clarify the statutory provisions of the Medicaid Act. The question of whether federal regulations (as opposed to federal statutory provisions) can ever grant privately-enforceable rights is an interesting and important question in its
own right, implicating nondelegation principles of administrative and constitutional law. That
issue is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment. For a recent exploration of this topic, see
3

4

John A. McBrine, Note, The Selective Use of Administrative Regulations in Creating Rights En-

forceable through § 1983 Actions, 46 BC L Rev 183, 183 (2004) (arguing that "both our modem
administrative state and public policy considerations support the derivation of § 1983 interests
from federal regulations").
8 42 CFR § 430.0.
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Despite the existence of an extensive scheme of federal statutory
and regulatory requirements within the Medicaid Act-and despite
massive federal and state expenditures on the program'-Medicaid
has been rife with problems almost from its inception. Chief amongst
these problems is physician underparticipation. Indeed, "physician
refusal to participate in the program has been so rampant that it has
that 'Medicaid has
led one commentator to categorically conclude
poor.' 10°

failed in its mission to care for the
Physician underparticipation and its attendant problems are so

commonplace that, in a recent lawsuit, Illinois responded to allega-

tions of sub-"break-even" reimbursement rates and rampant underprovision of "well-child" services in its Medicaid program by simply
arguing that its "results were no worse than those in other industrial
states."" The court barred Illinois from making this argument at trial,
but the point is well-taken: relying on state self-enforcement of the
Medicaid Act has often led to unsatisfactory results with respect to
access to care."

The lack of physician participation in Medicaid programscommonly attributed to systematically low reimbursement rates'and the attendant adverse effects on access to care are a bitter irony

9 See, for example, Marlaina S. Freisthler, Comment, Unfettered Discretion:Is Gonzaga
University v. Doe a Constructive End to Enforcement of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement
Provisions?,71 U Cin L Rev 1397,1397 ("Currently, the Medicaid program serves eleven percent
of the nonelderly population, and costs in excess of $184 billion annually. In fact, Medicaid is
second only to education in state budget expenditures, and amounts to forty percent of federal
contributions paid to states.") (internal citations omitted).
10 Id at 1397-98, quoting Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation:Patients;
Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 Am J L & Med 191,191 (1995).
11 See Frederick H. Cohen, An Unfulfilled Promise of the Medicaid Act: Enforcing Medicaid Recipients' Right to Health Care, 17 Loyola Consumer L Rev 375, 390 (2005). The case referenced is Memisovski v Patla, No 92-C-1982, on which Cohen served as lead counsel for the
plaintiffs. See generally Memisovski v Maram, 2004 WL 1878332 (ND III Aug 23, 2004) (memorandum opinion and order issued twelve years after initial filing of action).
12 See, for example, Memisovski, 2004 WL 1878332 at *15 ("Pediatric practices throughout
Cook County have closed to new Medicaid patients due to economic problems caused by a high
Medicaid pediatric population and low Medicaid reimbursement rates and slow Medicaid payment
systems"). See also id at *17 ("Most doctors in Cook County will either not see children on Medicaid or significantly limit the number of children on Medicaid that they will accept as patients.").
13 See, for example, id at *12 (finding that Illinois's Medicaid reimbursement rates "are, on
average, approximately half of the Medicare reimbursement rates for the same service, delivered
in the same location, by the same provider"). See also id at *13:
A pediatrician practice relying solely on Medicaid beneficiaries maximum reimbursements
could not survive since Medicaid pays nearly 10 percent less than the median practice cost&
The major studies on physician reimbursement rates have concluded that physician reimbursements are the predominant factor in the decision to participate in the Medicaid program at all, to participate in a limited fashion, or to participate fully.
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of sorts given the existence of a Medicaid Act "requirement" addressing just this problem. The Act's "equal access" provision reads:
A state plan for medical assistance must

. ..

provide such meth-

ods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment
for, care and services available under the plan.., as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care
and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic area."
The widespread failure of state Medicaid programs to enlist enough providers to even approximate equality of access-despite a clearly worded
statutory provision requiring the contrary -is emblematic of a more general failure by the states to self-police Medicaid Act compliance.
Nor does the federal Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)-the agency ostensibly tasked with the duty to oversee the
"federal" end of the state-federal Medicaid program- "enforce" state
noncompliance with Medicaid Act provisions in a punitive sense. This
is largely because the main "remedy" available to HHS for policing
state compliance with the Medicaid Act is "the blunt and seldom-used
club" of withholding federal Medicaid funding," which is hardly a
remedy for program beneficiaries. 6 In the absence of a direct private
remedy at law, "[p]rogram beneficiaries desiring compliance with federal requirements could only ask the federal government to further
cripple the program-not a result they are likely to seek."'7 Instead,
"the posture of the federal agency toward its grantees is not generally
that of a referee calling fouls, but that of a coach giving support in the
form of cash and expertise.""
This general reluctance by federal agencies to police states by
withholding program funding is particularly acute in the Medicaid
context, where massive budget overruns in state programs are almost
a matter of course and states are politically "locked-in" to federal fi42 USC § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
15 See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
CoherentSection 1983 Jurisprudence,103 Colum L Rev 1838,1839 (2003).
16 See, for example, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman,451 US 1, 52 (1981)
(White dissenting) ("[A] funds cutoff is [perceived to be] a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act.").
17 Samberg-Champion, Note, 103 Colum L Rev at 1839 (cited in note 15).
18 Edward A. Tomlinson and Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of FederalStandards in
Grant-in-Aid Programs:Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 Va L Rev 600, 620 (1972)
(illustrating how the agency enforcement of grant-in-aid programs has been deficient).
14
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nancial participation (FFP).'9 One of the reasons for the massive
budget overruns in state Medicaid programs is what has been called a
political "narcotic effect."'' Because FFP of 50 percent to 83 percent of
total Medicaid expenditures makes each additional $1 in state expenditures worth $2 to $6 in extra care, there is, in economic terms, a
moral hazard problem.2' States, economically and politically encouraged to "expand their Medicaid programs beyond levels they would
be willing or able to fund independently," eventually reach a level at
which even their fractional commitment becomes difficult to pay. But
at this point political constraints make cost-cutting (or "escape" from
FFP and the federal requirements attached thereto) by a state nearly
impossible, since for each dollar a state wants to save it must cut $2 to
$6 in program costs.!
Coupled with the general nonenforcement by federal agencies of
Spending Clause program requirements, the unique state budgetary
problems involved with Medicaid make HHS enforcement of the
Medicaid Act essentially a nullity. As one commentator has recently
stated,
Rarely does the federal bureaucracy itself comprehensively enforce state compliance with the terms of [Spending Clause] statutes. Instead, Spending Clause program requirements have been
enforced primarily by citizens acting as "private attorneys general." These program beneficiaries, often aided by public interest
lawyers who make careers of enforcing federal rights, use a variety of legal means to enjoin states that fail to live up to the com'
mitments made in accepting federal funds."
Since 1980, "the primary legal vehicle" for actions to enforce the requirements of Spending Clause programs has been § 1983."

19 See 42 USC § 1396d(b) (providing that FFP will range from 50 percent to 83 percent
depending on a state's average per capita income). See also FederalMedical Assistance Percentages, online at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap.htm (visited Apr 28, 2007) (providing tables
listing FFP for each state and the District of Columbia for fiscal years 1996-2007).
See generally James F. Blumstein and Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform through Medi20
caid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm,53 Vand L Rev 125,
141-44, 148-49 (2000) (commenting that "[a] form of state-level political dependency ... resulted
from state responses to the incentives that stemmed from the allure of federal matching moneys").
21 See Mark Andrew Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 1983
and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care,56 Vand L Rev 1479,1484-85 (2003).
22
23
24

25

Id.

See id at 1485 (observing that the exact figure would be determined by the level of FFP).
Samberg-Champion, Note, 103 Colum L Rev at 1838 (cited in note 15).
Id.
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III. THE ROAD TO GONZAGA: THE SUPREME COURT'S § 1983
SPENDING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE FROM 1980-2002

In 1980's Maine v Thiboutot," the Supreme Court ruled, for the

first time, that 42 USC § 1983, a statute granting a civil right of action
for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws,

27

applied to federal statutory-in addition

to federal constitutional -rights. 28 Since Thiboutot-which itself authorized a § 1983 action in the context of a Spending statute, the Social Security Act" -the Supreme Court's opinions in this area have
"not be[en] models of clarity."' However, it is safe to identify a general ebb and flow-tied closely to the makeup of the Supreme
Court-in the scope of the § 1983 enforcement right for Spending
Clause statutes.
In the decade following Thiboutot, the Supreme Court twice addressed the § 1983 right in the Spending Clause context. In Wright v
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,31 the Court, in a 5-4

decision, allowed a § 1983 suit by tenants for alleged overcharges under the Brooke Amendment (a rent-ceiling provision) of the Public
Housing Act of 1937 and its implementing regulations. The Court held
that, read in conjunction with its implementing regulations and the enforcement history of the statute, the Brooke Amendment conferred a

448 US 1 (1980).
42 USC § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added). Section 1983 reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
28 Thiboutot responded to recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the situations in
which a private right of action under a federal statute would be implied. See TransamericaMortgage Advisors; Inc v Lewis, 444 US 11, 19-20 (1979) (restricting the availability of private actions
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche & Co v Redington, 442 US 560,570 (1979)
(restricting implied private actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). By construing
§ 1983 to expressly authorize civil suits for the violation of federal statutory rights, the Court
avoided the constitutionally difficult situation of a federal right unprotected by any federal
remedy. See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1893) ("The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will cer26
27

tainly cease to deserve this high appellation,if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right.") (emphasis added).

29
42 USC § 601 et seq (2006). See Thiboutot, 44 US at 4 (holding that a plain language
reading of "and laws" "undoubtedly embraces [claims under] the Social Security Act").
30
Gonzaga, 536 US at 278 (acknowledging that prior Court opinions might have created
confusion in the lower courts).
31 479 US 418 (1987).
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legally enforceable federal right presumptively enforceable under
§ 1983, and that the state did not rebut this presumptionY

Wilder v Virginia HospitalAssociation,33 decided three years after
6
Wright, held that the Boren Amendment" of the Medicaid Act con-

ferred on providers a § 1983 private right of action. Also a 5-4 deci-

sion, Wilder looked to the legislative and enforcement history of the
Boren Amendment and the Medicaid Act generally to determine
whether the Amendment conferred enforceable § 1983 rights on pro-

viders." The Wilder court explicitly noted that:

[The § 1983 inquiry] is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a
particularstatute. In implied right of action cases, we ...determine whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted for the violation of statutory rights. The test reflects a
concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather
than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations
of statutes. Because § 1983 provides an alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits, these separation of powers concerns are not present in a § 1983 case.
The same four justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Scalia-dissented in both Wright and Wilder. In his Wilder dissent,
that would
Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced textualist arguments
in Gonzaga.3
Court
the
for
opinion
his
of
basis
the
later form

See id at 419-20, 424-25 ("Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative his32
tory devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in [the
federal agency], but there have also been both congressional and agency actions indicating that
enforcement authority is not centralized and that private actions were anticipated.").
33 496 US 498 (1990):
34 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(a) (repealed 1997):
A State plan for medical assistance must provide ...for payment of the ...services provided under the plan through the use of rates ...which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which
must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care
and services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality
and safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access ...to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality.
35 See Wilder, 496 US at 505 ("In order to determine whether the Boren Amendment is
enforceable under § 1983, it is useful first to consider the history of the reimbursement provision.") (emphasis added), 509 ("We must therefore determine whether the Boren Amendment
creates a 'federal right' that is enforceable under § 1983. Such an inquiry turns on whether 'the
provision in question was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff."') (emphasis added). Note
that the Wilder inquiry focused on the intent of the provision,and not whether the provision was
phrased in terms of the putative plaintiff.
36
Id at 508 n 9 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added).
Id at 524-27 (Rehnquist dissenting):
37
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Despite vigorous dissents in Wright and Wilder, both cases
seemed to establish a liberal doctrine relating to § 1983 rights of action under Spending Clause statutes. However, the 1992 replacement
of Thurgood Marshall, a key member of the five-vote majority in
Wright and Wilder, with Clarence Thomas, an avowed textualist and
federalist, might have portended a change in the Court's § 1983
Spending Clause jurisprudence. But if a sea change was in the air, it
did not follow immediately. While the Court did find that a Spending
Clause statutory provision conferred no enforceable rights in a case
argued just after Thomas's confirmation, the Court's 7-2 decision in
Suter v Artist M" explicitly upheld both the holdings and framework
of Wright and Wilder.39
Five years later, a unanimous Court decided Blessing v Freestone,'* which clarified a three-step analysis for finding a § 1983 enforcement right under a Spending Clause provision. Although it did
not overrule-and in fact purported to rely upon -precedents such as
Wilder, the Blessing Court explained:
We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining
whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal
right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in
question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so
"vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a
binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision
giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory
rather than precatory terms.'
The Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs in that case, five mothers
in Arizona, could not bring suit under § 1983 to force "substantial
compliance" with the entirety of a federal child support statute

[W]hile the Court's holding in Thiboutot rendered obsolete some of the case law pertaining
to implied rights of action, a significant area of overlap remained. For relief to be had either
under § 1983 or by implication... the language used by Congress must confer identifiable
enforceable rights .... Yet the Court virtually ignores the relevant text of the Medicaid

statute in this case.
503 US 347 (1992).
See id at 356-58.
40 520 US 329 (1997).
41 Id at 340-41, citing Wright, 479 US at 430, 431-32; Wilder, 496 US at 510-11; Pennhurst,
451 US at 17.
38
39
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"[w]ithout distinguishing among the numerous provisions of th[at]
complex program. 2
IV. TEXTUALISM AND § 1983: GONzAGA UNIVERSITY V DOE

If the previous two Court cases - Blessing in particular - hinted at
a narrowing trend in § 1983 Spending Clause jurisprudence, 2002's
Gonzaga was that trend's true coming-out. In Gonzaga, a five-justice
majority declared that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974C (FERPA) did not confer any personal rights enforceable under § 1983." The Court, via Chief Justice Rehnquist, both adopted a
framework hinted at in Rehnquist's Wilder dissent and harmonized
the § 1983 inquiry with that of the Court in its implied private right of
action cases. Utilizing this framework, the Court first stated, "[w]e now
reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
§ 1983.' In order to find such a "right conferral," the Court adopted a
text-centered inquiry:
The question whether Congress ...intended to create a private
right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative where a
statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable
class. For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be
phrased in terms of the persons benefited.... For example,... the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...create[s] individual rights because
[that] statute[] is phrased with an unmistakable focus on the
benefited class.46
The Gonzaga majority's unrelenting focus on a provision's specific text was a marked departure from the more broad-based inquiry
preceinto legislative intent demonstrated in Wilder and other Court
v Halderman'
Hospital
and
School
State
Pennhurst
example,
dent. For
looked at "the Act['s] legislative history," its "language and structure,"
and "the 'overall' [and] 'specific' purpose of the Act" for evidence of
"an intent to require the States to fund new, substantive rights.". InBlessing, 520 US at 332-33 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit that the "statutory
42
scheme [could] be analyzed so generally").
43
20 USC § 1232g et seq (2006).
See Gonzaga, 536 US at 275. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ken44
nedy composed the majority.
Id at 283 (rejecting the notion that "implied private right of action cases have no bearing
45
on the standards for discerning whether a statute creates rights enforceable by § 1983").
46 Id at 283-84 (alterations and last emphasis in original; internal quotations omitted; first
two emphases added).
47 451 US 1 (1981).
48 Id at 18.
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deed, the Pennhurst court cautioned: "In expounding a statute, we
must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. 9
In Wilder, the Court looked to the legislative and judicial history of
the Medicaid Act, both before and after the Boren Amendment, and
concluded that "experience demonstrates clearly that Congress and
the States both understood the Act to grant health care providers enforceable rights both before and after repeal of the ill-fated waiver
requirement." As Justice Stevens pointed out in his Gonzaga dissent,
"[T]he sort of rights-creating language idealized by the court has
never been present in our § 1983 cases.... None of [the statutes at issue in] Wright, Wilder, Suter, and Blessing involved the sort of 'no per-

son shall' rights-creating language envisioned by the Court. '' "l
To justify its textual focus, the Gonzaga majority opinion relied in
large part on federalist concerns, declaring that "separation-of-powers
concerns within the Federal Government [are not] the only guideposts
in this sort of analysis... . '[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it
must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the languageof
the statute.' 52 The Court then argued that, in the context of FERPA,
Congress would not have
intended ...to confer individual rights on millions of school students ...without having ever said so explicitly. [To conclude oth-

erwise would] entail[] a judicial assumption, with no basis in
statutory text, that Congress intended to set itself resolutely
against a tradition of deference to state and local school officials
by subjecting them to private suits for money damages whenever
they fail to comply with a federal funding condition."
In this and other language, the Gonzaga majority adopted a federalist viewpoint, earlier explained by the Court in Pennhurst,in which
a program enacted under the Spending Clause is seen as a "quasicontract" between the federal government and a State.
1

Id, quoting Philbrook v Glodgett,421 US 707,713 (1975).
Wilder, 496 US at 518 (emphasis added) (finding that this understanding makes it "implausible to assume" that Congress intended to deprive providers of a private right of action
under § 1983).
51 Gonzaga, 536 US at 297 (Stevens dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52 Id at 286 (majority), quoting Will v Michigan Departmentof State Police, 491 US 58, 65
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
53 Gonzaga, 536 US at 286 n 5 (internal citations omitted).
'4 Pennhurst,451 US at 17 (1981):
[Liegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The
49
50
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Many academics and civil rights lawyers saw Gonzaga as a fundamental change in the Supreme Court's § 1983 Spending Clause jurisprudence." One civil rights lawyer said of Gonzaga, "[i]t was less a
clarification than an evisceration of what the court's precedents had
held.... [T]he case signals an intention to substantially curb private
lawsuits on behalf of ...beneficiaries of federal entitlements."" Of

course, not everyone who saw Gonzaga as a fundamental change opposed the decision. One conservative lobbyist praised Gonzaga's
"anti-entitlement federalism" and "had high hopes ... that the ...justices would move to curb private lawsuits under 'the mother of all entitlement programs, Medicaid..'".
V. THE ROAD TO GONZAGA REDUX: THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Confronted with seemingly controlling precedent in Wilder, lower
courts throughout the early- to mid-1990s generally allowed both pro-

viders and recipients to bring § 1983 suits to enforce many Medicaid
Act provisions.u In 1997, however, the law grew somewhat murkier
after Congress-at the behest of nearly every governor in the nation-repealed the Boren Amendment. Then in 2000, the Fifth Circuit
split from other circuits that had ruled on the issue and held in Evergreen PresbyterianMinistries, Inc v Hood" that while Medicaid recipients could sue to enforce the Act's equal access provision, providers
legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." There can, of
course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
55
See generally, for example, Steve France, Hearing Loss: High Court is Rolling Back
Implied Rights of Action, 89 ABA J 18 (Feb 2003) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist himself
considered the decision one of the most influential of 2002).
Id (quoting New York City civil rights lawyer David Goldberg).
56
57
Id (quoting Michael Greve, director of the Federalism Project at the American Enterprise Institute).
58

See, for example, Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore, Inc v Bullen, 93 F3d 997,

1004 (1st Cir 1996) (holding that because the Boren Amendment and § 1396a(a)(30) contain
nearly identical substantive requirements, Wilder supports the use of § 1983 by providers to
enforce the subsection), overruled by Gonzaga, 536 US at 279-86, as recognized in Long Term

Care Pharmacy,Inc v Ferguson,362 F3d 50, 57 (1st Cir 2004) ("Gonzaga ...compels us to reexamine Bullen."). See also Methodist Hospitals Inc v Sullivan, 91 F3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir 1996)

(allowing providers to enforce the equal access provision using § 1983); Wood v Tompkins, 33
F3d 600,608 (6th Cir 1994) (finding that § 1396n(c) et seq waiver requirements are more like the
Boren Amendment in Wilder than the statute in Suter and therefore confer enforceable rights);

Arkansas Medical Society, Inc v Reynolds, 6 F3d 519,526 (8th Cir 1993) (holding that providers

may use § 1983 to enforce the equal access provision); Miller v Whitburn, 10 F3d 1315, 1319-20
(7th Cir 1993) (stating that "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services"
(EPSDT) provisions confer enforceable rights on recipient under Wilder test).
59 235 F3d 908 (5th Cir 2000).
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could not. - The Evergreen method-allowing recipients, but not providers, to bring § 1983 suit-would catch on in one more circuit before
the Supreme Court's Gonzaga decision, after which such rulings became the norm rather than the exception throughout the federal judiciary."
Three months prior to the Gonzaga decision in 2002, the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, broke from its own precedent and joined the
Fifth Circuit by denying § 1983 standing for a class of independent
pharmacists alleging violations of the Medicaid Act's equal access
provision.2 In a 6-5 opinion by then-Judge Alito (filed one month
prior to oral arguments and three months prior to the decision in
Gonzaga), Pennsylvania PharmacistsAssociation v Houstoun63 relied
on the first prong from the Supreme Court's three-part Blessing
analysis -whether the provision in question was intended to benefit
the plaintiffs-in finding that the plaintiff pharmacists lacked a private
right of action under § 1983.4 Judge Alito first noted that "the question whether a statute is intended to benefit particular plaintiffs is
quite different from the question whether the statute in fact benefits
those plaintiffs, or even whether Congress knew that the statute would
benefit those plaintiffs. 6' Relying on Supreme Court implied right of
action precedent, rather than § 1983, Alito framed the first-prong
Blessing inquiry as a basically textual question, asking whether the
statute was "phrased in terms of the persons benefited" and was
"draft[ed] ... with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class."' In
drawing upon the implied right of action cases and applying a decidedly textual inquiry into congressional intent, Alito's Pennsylvania
Pharmacistsopinion anticipated Gonzaga to a significant extent.

60
See id at 928 ("[lIt is apparent that while recipients have an individual entitlement to
equal access to medical care, any benefit to health care providers is indirect at best.").
61
See note 68 and accompanying text.
62
See Pennsylvania PharmacistsAssociation v Houstoun, 283 F3d 531 (3d Cir 2002) (en banc).
The "arguable" contrary Third Circuit precedent was a footnote in a 1999 decision, stating: "The Department argues at least in part that Rite Aid and the [Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association] may not
sue to enforce [certain] Medicaid regulations as section 30(A) does not support a private cause of
action. The district court rejected this argument and we agree with this result." PennsylvaniaPharmacists, 283 F3d at 534 n 4 (alterations in original; internal quotation marks and citations omitted), quoting Rite Aid of Pennsylvania,Inc v Houstoun,171 F3d 842,850 n 7 (3d Cir 1999).
63
283 F3d 531 (3d Cir 2002) (en banc).
64
Id at 535, citing Blessing, 520 US at 340; Wilder, 496 US at 509; Wright, 479 US at 430.
65
PennsylvaniaPharmacists,283 F3d at 535-36 (emphasis in original).
66
Id at 536, quoting Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,694 n 13 (1979) (alteration in original).
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VI. CIRCUIT SPLITS: LOWER COURT RESPONSE AFTER GONZAGA

After Gonzaga, the overall trend in Medicaid Act cases has been

towards a narrowed § 1983 enforcement right in an aggregate sense. In
particular, post-Gonzaga holdings in the district courts and the circuit
courts of appeals have restricted § 1983 Medicaid Act enforcement

along two metrics: by party and by statutory provision. However, to
merely identify a "narrowing trend" after Gonzaga fails to tell the

whole story: in fact, multiple circuit splits have developed regarding the
§ 1983 enforceability of various Medicaid Act provisions. While Gon-

zaga no doubt commands a text-focused analysis in determining § 1983

enforceability of Medicaid Act provisions, lower courts have divided

into two distinct camps regarding the proper "type" of textual analysis.

'6
One camp, which I call the "strict textualist" , camp, has con-

ducted an exceedingly narrow textual inquiry into whether a provision
is unambiguously phrased in terms of the persons bringing suit in a
particular case. Courts adopting a strict textual method of analysis-

including the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits-have endorsed sweeping curtailments of § 1983 rights under

some of the more ambiguously phrased provisions the Medicaid Act
(of which the equal access provision is a paradigmatic example). A
second camp, which I call the "pragmatic textualist" camp-including

many district courts and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit-

has conducted a more flexible analysis of the text of certain Medicaid
Act provisions, often resolving textual ambiguities by reference to the
structure and purpose of the Medicaid Act on the whole.
However, while these two camps have come to differing conclu-

sions on some of the more ambiguous issues of § 1983 enforceability
(e.g., whether Medicaid beneficiaries can bring suit under the Equal
Access provision of the Act), federal courts after Gonzaga have -with
one notable exception-uniformly held that providers cannot bring

§ 1983 suit under any Medicaid Act provision.6
67

For commentary on strict textualism, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, All About

Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101

Colum L Rev 990, 1088 (2001) (associating "strict textualism" with Scalia's views of originalism
and a complete rejection of legislative history); Ellen P Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary
Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 Ariz St L J 275,278-79 (1998).

See Sanchez v Johnson, 416 F3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that neither provid68
ers nor recipients can sue under equal access provision); National Medical Care v Rullan, 2005
WL 2878094, *7 (D Puerto Rico) (declaring that providers cannot sue under comparability provision); Protestant Memorial Medical Center, Inc v Maram, 2005 WL 2464460, *4-5 (SD Ill) (dismissing provider's suit to enforce "provisions of the Medicaid Act, specifically § 1396 et seq" for
failure to state a claim and rejecting provider's argument that "[Wilder] couches its language in

terms of § 1396 generally"); Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics v Fogarty,

366 F Supp 2d 1050, 1102-11 (ND Okla 2005) (holding that providers cannot sue under equal
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"Pragmatic Textualism"

The Gonzaga majority opinion probably ended any general presumption of § 1983 enforceability of substantive Medicaid Act requirements that may have lingered from Wilder, and may even have
created the opposite presumption. In subsequent cases, however,
lower courts have shown resistance to such a broad reading of Gonzaga in the Medicaid context - particularly where Wilder is still ostensibly good law.0 Instead, many lower courts-at least when faced with
recipient suits -have used a rather flexible textual analysis in deciding
whether the various provisions of the Medicaid Act are "phrased in
terms of the persons benefited." When the words of a particular Medicaid Act provision are sufficiently ambiguous with respect to
"phras[ing] in terms of the persons benefited," courts engaging
in
"pragmatic textualist" analysis will resolve such ambiguities by
looking to the meaning and importance of that provision within the purpose and structure of the Medicaid Act as a whole. 0 Moreover, there is

access, reasonable promptness, or EPSDT provisions); In re NYAHSA Litigation,318 F Supp 2d
30, 38-40 (NDNY 2004) (deciding that providers cannot sue under § 1396a(a)(13)(A)'s ratesetting "process" provision, equal access provision, or § 1396r nursing care "quality of life" provision); Clayworth v Bonta, 295 F Supp 2d 1110, 1121-24 (ED Cal 2003) (holding that providers
cannot sue under equal access provision); Burlington United Methodist Family Services; Inc v
Atkins, 227 F Supp 2d 593, 595-97 (SD W Va 2002) (same). See also Long Term Care Pharmacy
Alliance v Ferguson,362 F3d 50,58-59 (1st Cir 2004):
Prior to Gonzaga, whether subsection (30)(A) authorized private rights for providers was a
close question; the circuits were split on the issue, and well reasoned opinions had been written on both sides ... Whether Gonzaga is a tidal shift or merely a shift in emphasis, we are obligated to respect it, and it controls this case. Providers such as pharmacies do not have a private right of action under subsection (30)(A); if they think that state reimbursement is inadequate-and cannot persuade the Secretary to act-they must vote with their feet.
A skeptic might note that providers "voting with their feet"-i.e., leaving state Medicaid
programs-is precisely the problem, and not a step towards a solution. For the first postGonzaga opinion to hold that providers do have enforceable rights under the equal access provision, see PediatricSpecialty Care, Inc v Arkansas Department of Human Services, 443 F3d 1005,
1015-16 (8th Cir 2006).
69
See, for example, PediatricSpecialty Care,443 F3d at 1015 (rejecting defendants' argument that Gonzaga"foreclose[d] private causes of action based on the Medicaid Act").
70 The post-Gonzaga interpretive differences in the lower courts were-like the Gonzaga
opinion itself-largely anticipated by the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Pharmacists.Although
that case dealt with the right of providers to bring § 1983 suits under the equal access provision,
the Pennsylvania Pharmacistsdissent-joined by five Third Circuit judges-advocated for "pragmatic textualism" in interpreting whether Medicaid Act provisions grant § 1983-enforceable rights.
According to the dissent, a doctrine under which only Medicaid beneficiaries can bring suit
"lacks context [in] the real world of health care, which implicates the relationship between provider costs and the availability of services to Medicaid recipients." 283 F3d at 545 (Becker dissenting). As Chief Judge Becker explained, there is "a nexus between the interests of providers
and the interests of recipients, which is recognized by the express terms of Section 30(A)." Id
(emphasis added).
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specific language in Gonzaga which ostensibly supports such a
method."
A recent opinion by Judge Lefkow of the Northern District of Illinois provides an apt example of such "pragmatic textualism" in the
wake of Gonzaga. In Memisovski v Maram,2 a district court held that

the Medicaid Act's "equal access" and EPSDT provisions conferred
individual rights that could be enforced by a class of Medicaid-eligible

children via § 1983. After citing Gonzaga, however, the Memisovski

court's § 1983 "textual" analysis included a policy argument: "Through

§ 1396a(a)(30)(A), a mandatory obligation was imposed on the states

and no administrative mechanism was formulated so as to ensure
compliance with this obligation. This ... weighs in favor of a private

right of action to enforce this statutory section under § 1983.""' One
might observe, in reading Memisovski and similar district court opinions, that the reality of a courtroom full of needy litigants seeking
medical care can appear far removed from federalism-motivated ar-

guments about whether a certain sentence was "phrased in terms of
the persons benefited."7

In addition to the many district courts adopting a decidedly

"pragmatic textualist" approach after Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit
recently utilized an exceedingly broad textual analysis in Pediatric
Specialty Care,Inc v Arkansas Department of Human Services," a case
in which that court "did not read Gonzaga to require a different result

than [the court's] earlier decisions [holding that both recipients and

providers were unambiguously granted a federal right under the
Medicaid Act's equal access provision] .,6
The Pediatric Specialty Care court first disposed of ADHS's argument that "Gonzaga ... forecloses private causes of action based on

the Medicaid Act," noting that "[a]lthough Gonzaga takes a far more
See Gonzaga, 536 US at 286 ("[Wlhere the text and structure of a statute provide no
indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private
suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action.") (emphasis added).
72 2004 WL 1878332 (ND 11).
73 Id at *6. See also id at *6-7 (relying on a different section of Medicaid Act to "supplement" text of 30(A), examining the act's legislative history, and acknowledging that 30(A) is not
phrased in "typical rights creating language" but explaining that such language would not fit in
with the "structure" of statute).
74 On the other hand, critics might say that by "strayfing] from ... sound and established
constitutional principles in order to reach what [they] consider[] just result[s] in [] particular
case[s]," these courts "give[ I meaning to the ancient warning that hard cases make bad law."
Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441, 459 (1973) (Burger dissenting). On that subject, see Sabree v
Richman, 367 F3d 180, 183 (3d Cir 2004) ("That plaintiffs merit sympathy does not escape our
notice, but neither does it govern our reasoning. Rather, Gonzaga University provides the dispassionate lens through which this matter must be viewed.").
75 443 F3d 1005 (8th Cir 2006).
71

76

Id at 1014.
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restrictive view of rights-creating statutes, it did not overrule Wilder.""
The court then went on to conclude that "plaintiffs still prevail within
the terms of the Gonzagaframework,"'8 concluding, as to the plaintiffs'

equal access claim:
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A)[] is intended to benefit both CHMS
recipients and providers, and creates enforceable rights for both
groups. That subsection requires states to provide methods and
procedures for payment of care and services in a manner that ensures equal access to quality care for needy children. The beneficiaries are both the recipients of the services and the recipients of
the state's payment, who are the CHMS providers. The statute is
clear on its scope: to ensure payments are not too high, but yet
high enough to secure the participation of enough clinics so that
needy children receive equal access to quality health care.
In sum, as our prior cases have held, the rights conferred by
§§ 1396d(a)(13) and 1396a(a)(30)(A) are clearly established federal rights. Moreover, even accepting ADHS's invitation to reconsider prior established precedent, we find no error in the district court's holding that these provisions of the Medicaid Act are
enforceable by both CHMS recipients and providers through a
§ 1983 private cause of action."
In PediatricSpecialty Care, the Eighth Circuit demonstrated some
of the hallmarks of the "pragmatic textualist" approach. In deciding
whether a provision was phrased in "unambiguous rights-creating language," the court focused on whether the provision should naturally be
read to confer benefits on readily identifiable parties, rather than looking only to black-letter phraseology. In deciding whether the "right"
described therein was judicially enforceable, the court recognized that
courts can-and often do-make decisions based on metrics that require some degree of judgment (for example, the "reasonableness"
standard in tort law). Finally, the court took notice of the nature and
importance of the putative right asserted: namely, assuring that "needy
children receive equal access to quality care,"' in contradistinction to
the claim involved in Gonzaga, which the PediatricSpecialty Care court

described as "[a] student at Gonzaga's school of education su[ing] the
school under FERPA when he found out that the school's teacher certi-

77

Id at 1015.

78

Id (emphasis added).
Id at 1015-16 (internal citation omitted).
Id (emphasis added).

79
80
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fication specialist disclosed allegations of sexual misconduct to Washington's teacher certification agency without his permission."'"
It is important to note that some Medicaid Act provisions are unquestionably codified in the kind of "unambiguous rights-creating
language" lionized by the Gonzaga majority. There is reasonably wellsettled post-Gonzaga law in a majority of circuits upholding recipient
83
enforcement of the EPSDT,' reasonable promptness, availability,

comparability,u freedom of choice,6 and ICF/MR" provisions.
The fact remains, however, that most lower courts have not ignored the ideological shift--culminating in Gonzaga--in the Supreme
Court's post-Wilder opinions. Nor has the Court's emphasis on a spe-

cific textual "hook" on which to hang the hat of § 1983 standing gone

unnoticed. Since Gonzaga, an increasing number of circuit and district
courts have denied recipient standing to enforce certain provisions of
the Medicaid Act.m The most recent - and most drastic - restrictions of
Id at 1014.
See Dickson v Hood, 391 F3d 581, 603-07 (5th Cir 2004) ("[W]e conclude that the
EPSDT treatment provisions of the Medicaid Act contains the 'rights-creating language critical
to showing the requisite congressional intent to confer a new right."') (internal citation omitted);
OKAAP, 366 F Supp 2d at 1110-11 (same); Health Care For All, Inc v Romney, 2004 WL
3088654, *2-3 (D Mass) (same); Memisovski, 2004 WL 1878332 at "8-11 (same); Winn v Perdue,
218 FRD 277,293-95 (ND Ga 2003) (same).
83 See Bryson v Shumway, 308 F3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir 2002) (applying the Blessing threefactor test); Mundell v Board of County Commissioners of Saguache County, 2005 WL 2124842,
*3 (D Colo) (holding that § 1396a(a)(8) confers enforceable rights on recipients while
§§ 1396a(a)(10) and (17) do not); OKAAP, 366 F Supp 2d at 1107-09 (upholding the provision);
Reynolds v Giuliani,2005 WL 342106, *14-16 (SD NY) (same); Mendez v Brown, 311 F Supp 2d
134, 138-40 (D Mass 2004) (same); Romney, 2004 WL 3088654 at *2 (same); Rabin v WilsonCoker, 266 F Supp 2d 332, 341 (D Conn 2003) (same); White v Martin, 2002 WL 32596017, *6
(WD Mo) (same).
84 See Watson v Weeks, 436 F3d 1152, 1159-62 (9th Cir 2006) (holding that § 1396a(a)(10)
confers enforceable rights on recipients while § 1396a(a)(17) does not); Mendez, 311 F Supp 2d
at 138-40 (stating thlit § 1396a(a)(10) confers an enforceable right).
See Deisenroth v Holsinger, 356 F Supp 2d 763, 767-68 (ED Ky 2005) ("[T]he Court
85
concludes that the comparability of services provision . . . is privately enforceable under
§ 1983."); Romney, 2004 WL 3088654 at *2 (same); Masterman v Goodno, 2004 WL 51271, *9-10
(D Minn) (same); Ball v Biedess, 2004 WL 2566262, *5 (D Ariz) (same); Clayworth v Bonta, 295
F Supp 2d 1110,1121-24 (ED Cal 2003) (same).
86
See Deisenroth, 356 F Supp 2d at 768 (upholding a § 1983 suit under §1396n(c)(2)(C),
the compliance provision of § 1396(a)(23)); Masterman,2004 WL 51271 at *10 (same); Ball, 2004
WL 2566262 at *5 (same).
See Sabree, 367 F3d at 182-83 (holding that the provision "unambiguously confer[s]
87
rights vindicable under § 1983"); Deisenroth,356 F Supp 2d at 766-67 (same).
88 See, for example, Romney, 2004 WL 3088654 at *2 (holding that recipients may not bring
§ 1983 suit to enforce equal access provision because, although other Circuits have decided
otherwise, § 1396a(a)(30) "displays no intent to benefit any single class of individuals... [since]
the statute 'has no rights creating language and identifies no discrete class of beneficiaries"'),
quoting Long Term Care PharmacyAlliance, 362 F3d at 57. See also Watson, 436 F3d at 1162-63
(barring recipients from suing to enforce the § 1396a(a)(17) "reasonable standards" provision);
Sanchez, 416 F3d at 1062 (finding that neither providers nor recipients may sue to enforce the
81
82
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the § 1983 right in the Medicaid context have, relying specifically on
Gonzaga, adopted an exceedingly narrow "strict textualist" methodology.
B.

"Strict Textualism"

Courts adopting what I call a "strict textualist" inquiry look solely
to the black-and-white, objective words of a single statutory provision-to the exclusion of any analysis of statutory context or purpose-to determine whether that particular provision unambiguously
grants enforceable rights. The benchmark used by these courts is
whether a single provision is "phrased in terms of the person(s) benefited." A strict textualist court might, for example, compare a single
Medicaid Act provision to the paradigmatic "rights-creating language"
used in certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Under this
paradigm, a court looks to see whether a Medicaid Act provision is
phrased in terms such as, "[aill persons shall be entitled to . . . public
accommodation"'' or "[n]o person ...shall deny the right of any individual to vote." 91 If a particular Medicaid Act provision is not so

phrased, that is likely the end of the matter.9
The most notable examples of post-Gonzaga strict textualism in
Medicaid Act jurisprudence have occurred within the past year in
three respective federal circuit courts. After the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held, in successive decisions, that neither the equal
access nor the "reasonable standards" provisions of the Medicaid Act
confer enforceable rights on any private party,9 the courts of appeals
of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits quickly reached similar holdings with
respect to the Act's equal access provision.' The textual analysis leadequal access provision); Mundell, 2005 WL 2124842 at *3 (holding that a recipient may not sue to
enforce the § 1396a(a)(10) "availability" or the § 1396a(a)(17) "reasonable standards" provisions); Sanders v Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 317 F Supp 2d 1233,
1248-51 (D Kan 2004) (stating that recipient may not sue to enforce the § 1396a(a)(8) "reasonable promptness" or the § 1396a(a)(17) "reasonable standards" provisions); M.A.C. v Betit, 284 F
Supp 2d 1298, 1304-08 (D Utah 2003) (holding that recipients may not sue to enforce the
§ 1396a(a)(8) "reasonable promptness" provision, the § 1396a(a)(23)(A) and § 1396n(c)(2)(C)
freedom of choice provisions, or the more general "right to services" under the Medicaid Act). "
89
Pub L 88-352,78 Stat 241, codified at 28 USC § 1447,42 USC §§ 1971,1975a-d, 2000a et
seq (2000). For an example of this correlation, see Sanchez, 416 F3d at 1058 (noting that the
Gonzaga Court used Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "[a]s [an] examplen of paradigmatic
rights-creating language").
90 42 USC § 2000a(a) (emphasis added).
91 42 USC § 1971(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
92
See Sanchez, 416 F3d at 1062 ("Because we hold that § 30(A) fails the first prong of the
Blessing test, we do not need to consider the second and third prongs.").
93 See id at 1062; Watson, 436 F3d at 1162.
94 See Westside Mothers v Olszewski, 454 F3d 532, 542-43 (6th Cir 2006) (concluding that
subsection (30)(A) "has an aggregate focus rather than an individual focus" and its "broad and
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ing to these holdings-and in particular, the Ninth Circuit's analysiscan only be characterized as exceedingly strict.
In Sanchez v Johnson,9' the Ninth Circuit held that, "[b]ecause
[the equal access provision] lack[ed] 'rights-creating' language and
'any focus on individual entitlements,' and d[id] not anticipate a judicially-enforceable remedy," it did not create any federal right enforceable through § 1983.6 Shortly after its Sanchez decision, the Ninth Circuit held in Watson v Weeks that § 1396a(a)(17) of the Medicaid Act,
the Act's so-called "reasonable standards" requirement, was "not
framed in terms of the persons benefited, which is fatal under Gonzaga to the existence of a section 1983 right.""
The narrowness of the inquiry utilized by courts in the "strict textualist" camp cannot be overstated. Consider, first, the text of 42 USC
§ 1396a(a)(17), the so-called "reasonable standards" provision of the
Medicaid Act:
A state plan for medical assistance must ... include reasonable
standards ...for determining eligibility for and the extent of

medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with
the objectives of this title, (B) provide for taking into account
only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the
applicant or recipient and ...as would not be disregarded (or set

aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility for such aid,
assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of
any such income or resources.
Next, consider the relevant text of 42 USC § 1396a(a)(10): "A state
plan for medical assistance must ...provide-for making medical assistance available ...to-(i) all individuals [meeting specified conditions,

and] (ii) at the option of the state, [certain groups]."
Certainly, § 1396a(a)(10), the "availability" requirement, is "unambiguously phrased in terms of the persons benefited:" the "individuals" to whom medical assistance must be made available. Section
1396a(a)(17), while it does not mention individuals specifically, is certainly cast in terms of Medicaid recipients, referring to standards for

"eligibility for ... medical assistance." Certainly, Medicaid-eligible in-

dividuals are the intended beneficiaries of this provision. Moreover,
nonspecific" language is "ill-suited to judicial remedy"); Mandy R. v Owens, 464 F3d 1139,1147-48
(10th Cir 2006) (finding that the equal access provision "does not create a federal right enforceable
under § 1983" and noting the circuit split).
95 416 F3d 1051 (9th Cir 2005).
96 Id at 1061 (internal citations omitted).
97 436 F3d 1152 (9th Cir 2006).
98 Id at 1163.
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§ 1396a(a)(17) is rather obviously meant as a companion provision to
§ 1396a(a)(10): not only shall medical assistance be made available to
eligible individuals, the standards governing such eligibility must be
determined reasonably, i.e., solely on the basis of certain nondiscriminatory factors such as income and resources. Section 1396a(a)(17) is
not explicitly phrased in terms of the persons benefited because it is
meant to constrain and modify § 1396a(a)(10), which is explicitly
phrased in terms of the persons benefited. Faced with a lawsuit by
putative Medicaid beneficiaries alleging that medical assistance was
not available under reasonable eligibility standards, a "pragmatic textualist" court-relying, perhaps, on Gonzaga's admonition to examine
whether "the text and structure of a statute provide [an] indication
that Congress intends to create new individualrights,"" would consider
the two asserted provisions, § 1396a(a)(10) and (17), as complementary components of a single asserted right. Whatever the court's ultimate decision on the merits, these companion provisions would, logically, rise or fall together.
As for a "strict textualist" court, consider the entire analysis utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Watson v Weeks before it decided that, although § 1396a(a)(10) granted § 1983-enforceable rights, § 1396a(a)(17)
failed to grant enforceable rights to any private party:
There is insufficient evidence of congressional intent to create a
section 1983 right under this provision. Section 1396a(a)(17) is a
general discretion-granting requirement that a state adopt reasonable standards. It fails to provide an "unambiguously conferred right" and fails the first prong of Blessing. The key wording of section 1396a(a)(17) fails to even mention individuals or
persons. Unlike section 1396a(a)(10), section 1396a(a)(17) is not
framed in terms of the individuals benefited, which is fatal under
Gonzaga to the existence of a section 1983 right. Moreover, the
parenthetical statement in section 1396a(a)(17) that the state's
reasonable standards "shall be comparable for all groups" puts a
focus on the standards themselves and on their aggregate impact,
rather than on the benefits to individuals.0'
If Gonzaga-which used textualism to find no "right" to prevent
the disclosure of educational records-can be seen as "benign" strict
textualism, the Watson analysis is strict textualism at its most "malignant." Ignoring all other signals of legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit
determined, solely on a difference in wording, that there was a "right"

99 Gonzaga,536 US at 286 (emphases added).
100 Watson, 436 F3d at 1162 (internal citations omitted).
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to availability of treatment, but that there was no right to have reasonable standards in determining what treatment will be made "available." In coming to this determination, the Watson court completely
ignored-indeed, failed to even mention-that § 1396a(a)(10) and
§ 1396a(a)(17) are companion provisions that, read together, guarantee that "reasonable" treatment will be made "available." Without
§ 1396a(a)(17), on the other hand, the only services which are required to be made "available" are frozen by federal statute."l ' Thus,
millions of Medicaid beneficiaries in our nation's largest judicial circuit are no longer guaranteed treatment not specifically enumerated
in § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) no matter how many physicians certify this treatment as medically necessary, because a provision in the Medicaid Act
was "not phrased in terms of the persons benefited, which is fatal under Gonzaga.""°
This distinction may seem irrational on its face, but is even more
deleterious in its effects. Between the Ninth Circuit's Sanchez and
Watson decisions, the Medicaid beneficiaries in that circuit now have
no private "right" to equal access to medical care or to have their coverage scope determined under "reasonable procedures." Thanks to
Sanchez, the eleven million Medicaid beneficiaries in the Ninth Circuit now have a "right" to have medical assistance available, but no
right to have sufficient doctors, nursing facilities, and pharmacists to
provide it. Of course, after Watson, even if doctors are plentiful, medically necessary care need not be: states have been known to deny
medically necessary care based on arbitrary criteria,' ° after which the
101 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(10) ("A state plan for medical assistance must ... provide-for
making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed in paragraphs
(1) through (5) . .. of § 1396d(a) of this title.").
102 For example, if current Ninth Circuit law had prevailed in 1989, California could have
decided not to cover off-label uses of azidothymidine ("AZT") through MediCal and neither
providers nor beneficiaries would have any judicial recourse, despite the general agreement of
the medical community that this was the only available treatment for HIV or AIDS. See Weaver
v Reagen, 886 F2d 194, 198 (8th Cir 1989) (holding that § 1396a(a)(17) required Missouri's Medicaid program to cover such uses of AZT under similar facts).
103 See, for example, Herm v Beye, 57 F3d 906,911 (10th Cir 1995):
[T]his Circuit, as well as several other courts, has interpreted [the Medicaid Act] as imposing a general obligation on states to fund those mandatory coverage services that are medically necessary.... It may be that, pursuant to a generally applicable funding restriction or
utilization control procedure, a participating state could deny coverage for a service
deemed medically necessary in a particular case. But a state law that categorically denies
coverage for a specific, medically necessary procedure ... is not a reasonable standard ...
consistent with the objectives of the [Act].
(citations omitted). See also Weaver, 886 F2d at 198 (holding that a state plan cannot categorically deny coverage for off-label uses of AZT); Fred C v Texas Health and Human Services
Commission, 988 F Supp 1032, 1036 (WD Tex 1997), affd mem, 167 F3d 537 (5th Cir 1998) (declaring that the state may not deny treatment solely based upon age as there is no rational basis

1012

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:991

aggrieved beneficiary's only meaningful recourse has been to § 1983.
As one court of appeals articulated, "[The 'reasonable standards']
provision has been interpreted to require that a state Medicaid plan
provide treatment that is deemed 'medically necessary' in order to
comport with the objectives of the Act .... '[S]erious statutory questions
might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical
treatmentfrom its coverage. ""'
VII. METHODOLOGIES COMPARED

The foregoing has identified two distinct textualist methodologies
employed by lower courts interpreting the Medicaid Act in § 1983
adjudications after Gonzaga. On their faces, both interpretive methodologies have some plausible legal basis in the general § 1983 context. Pragmatic textualism approaches an intentionalist method of
statutory interpretation; while rooted in the text of a spending program statute, this method looks beyond the text of a given provision,
crediting sources such as statutory context (for example, companion
provisions) and overarching programmatic purposes. Strict textualism,
in contrast, relies upon federalist concerns surrounding § 1983 enforcement of the Spending Clause requirements; this method is rooted
in concerns for state autonomy.
As I argue below, however, the federalist concerns putatively justifying strict textualism in the general spending program context simply do not translate to the Medicaid Act, where public health models,
empirical evidence, and the Court's own Spending Clause doctrine
turns the federalist justification for strict textualism on its ear. Indeed,
public health considerations, far from rendering federalist concerns
inapplicable to the Medicaid Act, counsel that pragmatic rather than
strict textualism best preserves the long-term autonomy of the states.
A. Federalist Concerns, Clear Statement Rules, and
the Medicaid Act
While Part VI.B argues that a strict textualist methodology could
have illogical, and even deleterious, effects on Medicaid beneficiaries,
this does not resolve the dilemma facing lower courts after Gonzaga.
After all, Gonzaga was hardly decided with an eye toward the welfare
of FERPA beneficiaries:indeed, the primary holding of that case suborfor distinguishing between those over and under twenty-one); McDaniel v Betit, 1996 WL 426816,
*2 (D Utah) (same); Hunter v Chiles, 944 F Supp 914, 920 (SD Fla 1996) (same); Salgado v Kirschner,878 P2d 659,665 (Ariz 1994) (same).
104 Weaver, 886 F2d at 198, quoting Beal v Doe, 432 US 438,444-45 (1977) (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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dinated the welfare of a FERPA beneficiary to broader federalist concerns for state autonomy and for the well-being of overtaxed state
treasuries. Accordingly, while the weight of the putative "right" involved

might hold some sway in post-Gonzaga § 1983 analysis-this would
seem relevant to an inquiry into "Congress['s] inten[t] to create new
individual rights"', and into the "structure of [the relevant] statute""courts must also consider the interwoven considerations of state autonomy and fiscal well-being based on Gonzaga'sfederalist concerns.

There are a few distinct areas of federalist concern regarding the
§ 1983 enforcement right in the Medicaid context. The first concern is
straightforward: health care regulation is an area of traditional state
hegemony, so federal intrusion into state Medicaid programs should
be minimal."' A related "new federalist" concern-one repeatedly
advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist throughout his career on the

bench -is that the "rights" conferred by entitlement programs such as
Medicaid aren't rights in the traditional, "constitutional" sense, but are
rather positive grants from the government that should be able to be

limited or withheld without the same degree of judicial scrutiny. Of
particular applicability to § 1983 suits is the concern that the federal
government cannot be sued under § 1983, and Medicaid is in theory a
state-federal "partnership" of sorts.
A final concern-and one which speaks with particularity to the
textual analysis required by Gonzaga-is a "clear statement" concern
related to Medicaid's enactment under the Spending Clause: while
Congress's power to impose particularized requirements in areas of
traditional state hegemony by conditioning the use of federal funds
has been repeatedly upheld as a legal principle,C' concrete applications
105Gonzaga,536 US at 286.
106 Id.
107 See, for example, Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Laboratories Inc, 471 US
707,719 (1985) ("[R]egulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local
concern.").
108See Harrisv McRae, 448 US 297,316-17 (1980):

Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary services generally, but not
certain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves
an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a
medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no
health care costs at all.
See also Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 201-02 (1991) (upholding an HHS regulation making it
impermissible for Title X programs to pay for abortion counseling and advocacy because, inter
alia, "Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with
the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all").
109See, for example, South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203,206-07 (1987) (upholding the condition of raising the state drinking age). See also Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 474 (1980)
(upholding a set-aside program reserving federal funds for minority-owned businesses); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Districtv McCracken,357 US 275,295 (1958) ("[B]eyond challenge is the power of the
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of this power are subject to examination. One "general restriction articulated by [the Supreme Court's] cases ... require[s] that if Congress

desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so
knowunambiguously,... enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice
10
ingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.""

At its base, however, federalism-no matter how embodied-is
fundamentally concerned with preserving state autonomy. In particu-

lar, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has emphasized that federal
courts faced with private § 1983 suits under Spending Clause statutes
must have due regard for the rights of states as autonomous parties to
a federal-state "quasi-contract." Under a system of federalism in
which each state is, in some sense, a sovereign, Congress cannot simply
"commandeer," by fiat, state governments,"' particularly in traditional
areas of state sovereignty such as health care. But the same conception of state quasi-sovereignty allows that state to enter into quasicontractual "bargains" with the federal government in which the consideration provided by the states in exchange for federal funding takes
the form of federal conditions upon state regulation in a certain
area."2 Like any bargained-for exchange, however, such a quasicontract can only be effective if, inter alia, both parties are fully informed of the terms of the bargain."' On the quasi-contract theory of
Spending Clause regulation, limiting suits against the states for "un-

Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal funds."); Oklahoma
v United States Civil Service Commission, 330 US 127, 144 (1947) ("The offer of benefits to a
state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual."); Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US 548, 597-98
(1937) (holding that the Social Security Act constitutionally offers conditions to the states in
return for state-created retirement systems); United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 66 (1936) (disallowing the condition that farmers reduce their output in exchange for federal funds). But see
Pennhurst, 451 US at 17 n 13 ("Even the ... respondents, like the court below, recognize the
'constitutional difficulties' with imposing affirmative obligations on the States pursuant to the
spending power.").
11o Dole, 483 US at 207 (first alteration added, all other alterations in original), quoting
Pennhurst,451 US at 17.
111 See New York v United States, 505 US 144, 161 (1992) ("Congress may not simply commandee[r] the legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.") (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted).
112 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17 ("Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is
much in the nature of a contract; in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.").
113 See id:
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can,
of course, be no knowing acceptance if a state is unaware of the conditions or is unable to
ascertain what is expected of it.
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foreseeable" (that is, not "clearly stated") obligations merely follows
the familiar principle of Hadley v Baxendale."'

Of particular importance, however, is the fact that none of the
Rehnquist Court's federalism-infused § 1983 Spending Clause jurisprudence-not Suter, nor Blessing, nor, of course, Gonzaga- actually
involved the Medicaid Act. This is highly material on the Rehnquis-

tian quasi-contract or market-based view of the Spending Clause because, simply put, the uniquely regulated domestic health care market
differs materially from every other domestic market, including that for
education.
B.

Market Considerations: EMTALA, Public Health, and the Cost

of U.S. Health Care
The cost of medical treatment increases with (1) decreased well-

ness and (2) increased urgency. The first of these factors is simply a
measure of "quantity" in the health care market-the amount of "curing" that needs to be accomplished to achieve wellness should be ex-

pected to correlate positively with cost. However, unlike in most markets, the relationship between decreased wellness and increased cost-tocure is, for many maladies, nonlinear. Indeed, a significant body of public health research suggests that cost-to-cure can rise almost exponentially for certain maladies if they are allowed to develop for a significant
period of time." That the cost of medical treatment can grow exponen-

tially as wellness deteriorates can be seen as a literal embodiment of the
old adage: "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

The second factor related to increased cost-to-cure -increased
urgency of care-is related to supply inelasticity in the market for
114 156 Eng Rep 145 (Ex 1854) (limiting consequential damages for breach of contract to
those damages reasonably foreseeable to the parties at the time of contracting and requiring
disclosure, at the time of contracting, of unique circumstances in order to recover unique damages for breach).
115 See generally, for example, Hensin Tsao, Gary S. Rogers, and Arthur I. Sober, An Estimate of the Annual Direct Cost of Treating Cutaneous Melanoma, 38 Journal of the American
Academy of Dermatology 669 (1998). See also Joan Schwartz, Late-stage Melanoma Patients
Have Most Expenses for Treatment, B.U. Bridge Research Briefs (May 15, 2003), online at
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/researchbriefs/display.php?id=88 (visited Apr 28,2007):

About 90 percent of the total annual direct cost for treating melanoma, a deadly form of
skin cancer, is spent on those with advanced disease-less than 20 percent of all melanoma
patients ....
The staggering medical expense in treating these late-stage patients provides
an incentive for better skin cancer surveillance and prevention programs... [T]he annual
direct cost of treating newly diagnosed melanoma in 1997 was estimated to be at least $560
million, and it may exceed $1 billion.... When discovered early, melanoma can often be
treated effectively, but is more deadly when discovered at an advanced stage ....Our study
shows that early detection saves both lives and money."
(quoting Dr. Gary Rogers).
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medical care, and is most obvious in the emergency room setting.
Hospital emergency rooms must be equipped to handle nearly every
treatment specialty under rigorous time constraints. As a result, few of
the cost-saving efficiencies from specialization that are present in
nonemergency medical treatment can be achieved in the emergency
room setting, and the aggregate cost of a given procedure administered in a hospital emergency room is significantly higher than the
cost of that same procedure in a nonemergency room setting. '
Neither of the above factors would seem to be particularly harm-

ful in a market in which the participants are made to bear the full cost
of their actions. Indeed, a cost-conscious, self-paying health care consumer should be expected to (1) utilize preventative and diagnostic
care whenever possible, given the large long-run cost savings from
procedures such as, for example, regular well-checkups and vaccinations; and (2) utilize emergency care -and in particular, hospital emergency rooms-only when faced with a real medical emergency, given
the disproportionate cost of emergency room utilization.
In the publicly funded health care market, however, neither of
these conditions necessarily holds true. In particular, in the Medicaid
market in many states, the first condition above -utilization of preventative and diagnostic care such as well-checkups-is foreclosed to
beneficiaries by inadequate physician reimbursement under Medicaid. "7 Lacking adequate access to regular physicians, Medicaid bene-

116 It had long been believed that the cost of nonurgent emergency room care was as much
as triple the cost of nonurgent, nonemergency care. Indeed, in a televised speech to a joint session of Congress and the nation in September 1993, President Clinton referred to emergency
departments as "the most expensive place of all." Robert M. Williams, The Costs of Visits to
Emergency Departments,334 New Eng J Med 642, 642 (1996). As a 1996 article in the New England Journal of Medicine put it:

It is widely believed that about half of all visits to emergency departments are for minor
medical problems and that the cost of a nonurgent visit to an emergency department is triple the cost of a visit to a physician's office. Diverting nonurgent visits from emergency departments to private physicians' offices is viewed as a way to gain substantial savings.
Id. Williams-and certain other recent empirical studies-suggest that there was less cost disparity between nonurgent emergency care and nonurgent, nonemergency care than was previously
thought. See id. ("The potential savings from a diversion of nonurgent visits to private physicians' offices may... be much less than is widely believed."). However, these recent studies have
been criticized by some medical professionals and policy analysts for, inter alia, failing to take
into account the significant collateral costs of emergency care. See, for example, Carolyn L.
Baier, Letter to the Editor, Costs of Visits to Emergency Departments, 335 New Eng J Med 209,
209 (1996) (arguing that "[t]he lack of access in certain areas to any care other than that provided by the emergency department is an argument for improving access, not for providing nonurgent care in emergency departments, whatever the cost").
117 See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation:Patients Poverty,and Physician
Self-Interest, 21 Am J L & Med 191,194-98 (1995) (reviewing empirical evidence), 192-93:
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ficiaries are therefore likely to wait for a serious illness or other health
condition to develop before seeking medical assistance, and to seek

this medical assistance from a location that is required-perhaps independently of Medicaid-to provide care."' Because of an independent federal statute-the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)" 9- requiring that Medicare-eligible
hospitals treat any patient presenting at that hospital with emergency
symptoms, Medicaid beneficiaries denied access to regular physician
care are likely to present (1) with later-stage illnesses or medical conditions (2) at a publicly funded hospital emergency room.'2 Both of
these, however, are major sources of the disproportionate cost of care.
America[] [has a] long tradition of dual-track medical care: one track for those with money
and another for those without. Medicaid promised to end this dual class delivery system by
providing poor people with health insurance they could use to purchase private medical
care. However, this promise has never been fulfilled, and the dual system continues. Privately insured patients receive primary care in private physicians' offices. Medicaid enrollees and uninsured people generally receive services in underfunded and understaffed hospital emergency rooms and outpatient clinics where overcrowding effectively rations care.
Medicaid has failed to end dual-track medical care for the poor because it has failed to attract physicians to the program. Twenty-five percent of our nation's physicians simply refuse to treat Medicaid patients. Perhaps more importantly, of those physicians who do treat
Medicaid patients, two-thirds limit the number of Medicaid patients they treat. Nearly all
doctors share the same rationale for avoiding Medicaid patients: low Medicaid reimbursement. Put simply, doctors avoid Medicaid patients because they are paid less to treat them.
To make matters worse, most doctors can afford to avoid Medicaid patients who comprise
only a marginal source of income for most physicians. [I]f Medicaid is ever to end the separate and unequal system of medical care it must attract private physicians into the program.... Th[e] history [of Medicaid reimbursement and access to care], read in light of empirical studies, shows that physicians respond to the lure of higher fees.
118 See id at 198 (noting that "[tihe [cost] problem is exacerbated by overcrowding and long
waits at public facilities which cause patients to delay seeking treatment until their conditions
become so serious that they require even more expensive treatment and more frequent hospitalization").
119 42 USC § 1395dd (2006). EMTALA, established under the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, is often referred to as the "Anti-Dumping" statute. See generally, for example, Thomas A. Gionis, Carlos A. Camargo, Jr., and Anthony S. Zito, Jr., The Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State Cause of Action to Address the Shortcomings of
the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 52 Am U L Rev
173 (2002) (detailing the anti-dumping provisions of both EMTALA and similar state statutes).
120 Watson describes the phenomenon as follows:
[Liow Medicaid physician reimbursement forces Medicaid enrollees to turn to public hospitals and public clinics, hospital emergency rooms, and outpatient departments for medical
care. This phenomenon greatly increases the cost of the Medicaid program because providing primary care in hospital outpatient facilities and emergency rooms is more expensive
than providing the same care in a physician's office. The problem is exacerbated by overcrowding and long waits at public facilities which cause patients to delay seeking treatment
until their conditions become so serious that they require even more expensive treatment
and more frequent hospitalization.
Watson, MedicaidPhysician Participation,21 Am J L & Med at 198 (cited in note 117), citing Physician Payment Review Commission, Report to Congress: Physician Payment Under Medicaid 23-24
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Indeed, as a 2004 Policy Statement by the American Academy of

Pediatrics' Committee on Pediatric Emergency Medicine put it:
Subsequent revisions, reinterpretation, and increased enforcement of this law over the past decade have expanded the reach of
EMTALA, delineating the responsibility of hospitals, EDs, and

their physicians to provide services to all patients who request
them in a nondiscriminatory and consistent manner. The law
specifies that the scope of the MSE should include all ancillary

services routinely available to the ED, such as physician consultation and inpatient care, if required. In the absence of a national
universal health benefits program,hospital EDs are essentially the
only place in our current health care system at which all patients
are guaranteedmedical care.12 '

Given these realities, selective nonenforcement of Medicaid Act
provision does not necessarily equate to selective reductions in health
care expenditures. Instead, EMTALA and similar laws provide an

almost perfectly inelastic baseline of care from government-funded
hospitals -and at the highestpossible cost.

The upshot of this analysis is that it is in the long-term financial
interest of state treasuries to have a comprehensive, well-functioning
Medicaid system with a public health and wellness-based focus. Of
absolute necessity to this goal in the medium-to-short term is reasonable access to medical care in a regular, nonemergency setting. This, of
course, is the exact mandate of the Medicaid Act's "equal access" provision. Over a longer time horizon, preventative measures such as
childhood screening and vaccination-covered by some of the EPSDT
provisions of the Medicaid Act -are important steps towards efficient
health care spending.
(1991), reprinted in 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) Special Rep No 661 (July 18, 1991). See
also Robert E. Hurley, Hoangmai H. Pham, and Gary Claxton, A Widening Rift in Access and Quality: Growing Evidence of Economic Disparities, Health Affairs Web Exclusive, online at
http://content.healthaffairsorg/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaffw5.566 (visited Apr 28,2007):
EMTALA obligates EDs [emergency departments] to evaluate and stabilize all patients
who seek care. This open door is subject to exploitation, and the ED directors interviewed
decried the extent to which patients and competing providers, including private physicians,
rely on this policy to use EDs for care that should be available elsewhere. In some cases,
this ... reveals the frustrationof community-based primary care providers who, knowing that
they will be unable to find office-based specialty care for a Medicaid or uninsured patient,
send such patients to the ED because the hospital has a call list of availablespecialists who
will see patientsin the ED.
(emphasis added).
121 Overcrowding Crisisin our Nation's Emergency Departments: Is Our Safety Net Unraveling?
114 Pediatrics 878 (2004), online at http://pediatricsaappublicationsorg/cgi/content/flll4/3/878
(visited Apr 28, 2007) (emphasis added) (characterizing EMTALA as "The Underfunded Federal Mandate for Universal Health Care").
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But the foregoing merely provides empirical evidence regarding
"a State's long-term best interest": at first glance, this is the language
of paternalism, not of federalism. How, then, can it be that concerns
about state autonomy would counsel federal courts to give due regard
to their own determinations about "long term financial interest"? The
initial answer to this is that adopting "pragmatic," rather than "strict,"
textualism in interpreting the Medicaid Act focuses not on the federal
judiciary's determinations, but on Congress's!"This, of course does not

end the federalist inquiry, but merely refocuses it: congressional paternalism would be paternalism nonetheless.
It turns out, however, that pragmatic textualism's focus on congressional intent and the structure of the Medicaid Act as a whole is
highly material--even dispositive - to federalist concerns about state

autonomy. Congress's Spending Clause power is only legitimate to the
extent that it is not "so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure
turns into compulsion. ' '' .. But "a conditional grant of federal money
...is [not] unconstitutional simply by reason of its success in achieving
the congressional objective."' 2" Instead, where "the enactment of ...

laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory, but in
fact," a state's autonomy is preserved even though Congress might
regulate, through encouragement, "what it might lack the power to
impose ...directly.''

Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in South Da-

kota v Dole'-the leading modern case on the limits of Congress's
Spending power-makes clear that a state's autonomy is threatened
where "the enactment of... laws" is no longer the state's prerogative.f
The crucial inquiry under Dole, therefore, is whether a state retains
the prerogative, in fact, to exit Medicaid, since the Medicaid quasicontractual bargain exchanges (A) federal financial participation for
(B) adherence to the regulatory conditions embodied in the Medicaid
Act.
Whether states, in fact, have an "exit prerogative" under Medicaid as it presently exists is not necessarily answered in the affirma122 Focusing on the "text and structure," Gonzaga, 536 US at 286 (emphasis added), of the
Medicaid Act and on what "Congress intended," id, clearly focuses upon congressional intent.
This intent-centered inquiry stands in stark contrast to a narrow determination of whether each
provision, in textual isolation, is "framed in terms of the persons benefited," Watson, 416 F3d at
1163, which centers upon notice to the states.
123 Dole,483 US at 211, quoting Steward Machine Co, 301 US at 590.
124 Dole, 483 US at 211 (emphasis added).
125 See id at 211-12 (stating that "[hiere Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose,"
through which the states retained their lawmaking prerogative).
126

483 US 203 (1987).

127

See id at 211-12 (emphasis added).
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tive. The "narcotic" theory of FFP ' 2 provides a plausible story as to
why states might be locked in to the program for at least the short
term. Moreover, any federalist theory under which Medicaid Act enforcement should be limited by the federal courts must necessarily
rely on some variant of this theory- otherwise, the proper institution
to "limit" Medicaid would be the states themselves, by utilizing their
right to refuse FFP. But if the "narcotic theory" is correct, and state
autonomy is threatened because of the states' inability to wean themselves from FFP, then the Medicaid-linked threat to state autonomy is
inextricably bound up with budgetary concerns.
Once it is understood that this story-a story linking Medicaid
cost overruns and state autonomy -underlies the federalist concern
with private enforcement of the Medicaid Act, pragmatic textualism
becomes a methodology in service of rescuing state autonomy from
the "narcotic effects" of FFP To the extent that a strict textualist
methodology merely tears at the Medicaid Act, provision-byprovision, and eschews long-term efficiency in favor of short-term cost
deferment, states shoot themselves-and their future ability to rid
themselves of FFP, should they so choose-in the foot. Instead of enhancing state autonomy, such a methodology forges the chains of longterm FFP dependence by the states: where state Medicaid programs
are inefficiently run, and perpetually broke, dependence upon federal
assistance is all but assured.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Even faced with a reality of excess Medicaid expenditures, any
meaningful cost-cutting or utilization-limiting scheme must be attuned
to the Act itself as an integrated scheme of providing a meaningful
entitlement to medical care. A meaningful health care delivery system
balances access, quality of care, choice of providers, and cost and utilization control- and the Medicaid Act is an integrated scheme developed by Congress and HHS to balance these factors.
Where administrative realities turn limitations on the § 1983 enforcement right into limitations on Medicaid Act enforcement generally, sifting through the Act provision by provision and cutting out
those provisions "not phrased in terms of the persons benefited" is a
limiting principle that is consistent neither with the Act's aims nor
with the aim of actually cutting the public cost of indigent health care.
If limitations on Medicaid spending and "tough choices" involving
putative beneficiaries are necessary, the proper way to make these

128

See text accompanying notes 19-23.
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choices is not by comparing the text of individual Medicaid Act provisions to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the aim of some courts to
find a "dispassionate lens through which [Medicaid beneficiary suits]
must be viewed"'v might seem admirable as a means of controlling
cost-overruns in state health care budgets, this cost-limiting aim is
perverted by a mode of textual analysis that can lead to underenforcement of the very mandates that would serve efficiency and longrun savings in public health care expenditures.
Finally, in determining whether a Medicaid Act provision grants
enforceable private rights, a "pragmatic textualist" approach-one
that recognizes the Medicaid Act as a complex, interlocking scheme can do more than just vindicate the welfare of our nation's underprivileged; it can help to restore the long-term autonomy of the states by
bringing fiscal sanity to a wildly inefficient system of public health
care.
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See Watson, 436 F3d at 1159, citing Gonzaga,536 US at 284.
Sabree v Richman, 367 F3d 180,183 (3d Cir 2004) (describing Gonzaga).
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